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THE REVOLT AGAINST THE DOLLAR AND

TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM
An economist who has lived, and worked both in Europe and the United States unveils
some of the mystiques surrounding international monetary issues.

Dr. Gabriel P. Racz
Memphis, Tennessee

was freely traded. At times, demand for gold
exceeded its supply; at other times, supply ex
ceeded demand. The fixed value of currencies
was maintained by the generally accepted ob
ligation of the Central Banks (the Federal
Reserve in the U.S.) to buy gold if an excess
supply developed (i.e., create gold reserves)
and to sell from these accumulated gold re
serves whenever the demand for gold exceeded
its supply on the market. As the result of
these Central Bank operations, only small fluc
tuations occurred around the exchange rates.
The price spread or fluctuation was determined
by the cost of shipping gold between the
various financial centers (London, New York,
Zurich, Paris, etc.). Gold reigned supreme!
During the Great Depression, nation after
nation was forced to abandon the gold stan
dard. Evaluating the gold standard system, one
must note its great advantage—the fixity of ex
change rates and the associated ease and cer
tainty of international payments. On the nega
tive side, one must recognize the fact that a
nation’s domestic money supply (increase or
decrease) was determined by (1) the Central
Banks’ compensatory actions on the gold mar
ket and (2) the uncertain levels of yearly gold
production. Domestic stabilization policies (i.e.,
monetary supply expansion in times of reces
sion and monetary supply contraction in times
of inflation) increasingly became primary na
tional economic objectives. The stabilization

The action taken by five West European
countries (West Germany, Switzerland, Bel
gium, Holland, and Austria) in May 1971 to
“appreciate” the value of their national curren
cies relative to the U.S. dollar, and thereby in
fact “depreciate” the value of the dollar, sig
naled the beginning of the end of the inter
national monetary system set up in the closing
days of World War II (1944 Bretton Woods
Conference). From 1944 until 1971 the dollar
had the role of anchor currency of world trade
and finance. The announcement by the Presi
dent of the United States on August 15, 1971
that the United States would no longer con
vert foreign-held dollars into gold gave official
recognition to the demise of the old system.

The Development of the
Bretton Woods System
Preceding the present system, the so-called
“gold standard” had reigned since before World
War I; it collapsed under the impact of the
world-wide Great Depression in the early
1930’s. Under the gold standard, the relation
ships of national currencies to each other (the
rates of exchange) remained fixed, since the
common denominator for all currencies was
gold. For example, if one ounce of fine gold
was worth 14.6 English pounds ( £ ), $35, 140
German marks, or 175 French francs, the ex
change rates for the currencies would be fixed
at £ 1 = $2.40 = 9.6 marks = 12 francs. Gold
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against which the value of all other currencies
was fixed. Herein lies the meaning of the often
heard statement that “the dollar is as good as
gold”. The dollar not only shared the spotlight
with gold but, in fact, the U.S. dollar became
supreme while gold was assigned only a sup
porting role.

goals of the nations conflicted with the Cen
tral Banks’ gold market operations, which were
aimed primarily at maintaining fixed exchange
rates.
The demise of the gold standard left a vac
uum which was filled with some experimenta
tion with freely fluctuating rates, flexible rates,
and finally with exchange controls, which be
came dominant from the mid-1930’s until Bret
ton Woods. Under the controls, individuals and
firms acquiring foreign claims were required
to report them to the Central Bank. The Cen
tral Bank retained the foreign currencies and
paid the countervalue in the national curren
cy. The Central Bank then rationed foreign
currencies to importers and individuals in a
very strict administrative and restrictive man
ner. This practice led to a world-wide decrease
in international trade and financial transac
tions, to economic isolation, and often to open
economic warfare among nations.
The hope and objective at Bretton Woods
was to create a system which would avoid the
undesirable aspects of previous approaches
while capturing their best features. The main
effects to be avoided were: (1) the rigid ex
change rates and the associated deflationary
side effect of the gold standard, (2) the insta
bility of freely fluctuating rates, and (3) the
repressive and distorting techniques of ex
change controls.
The system which finally emerged from all
these considerations at Bretton Woods became
known as the “gold exchange standard”. True,
gold still played a limited role in the new sys
tem as reserves and as a computational point of
reference. However, the stabilization operations
of Central Banks were no longer conducted by
buying and selling gold. Rather, currencies
were stabilized in terms of their dollar values
and Central Banks were no longer committed
to redeem their currencies in gold. Only the
United States maintained a commitment to ex
change dollars held by foreign Central Banks
for gold (at $35 an ounce). In reality, there
fore, the U.S. dollar became the true standard

Sources and Uses of Foreign Exchange
and the Balance of Payments
The United States acquires foreign exchanges
(1) by exporting commodities,
(2) by exporting services (selling U.S. trans
portation, services, receiving tourists, sell
ing insurance policies to foreigners, etc.),
(3) through inflow of foreign capital to the
United States,
(4) by receiving unilateral transfers (gifts and
grants to U.S. citizens from foreigners),
(5) by selling gold for foreign currencies on
the world’s money markets.
Export of domestically produced goods is
the most important source of foreign exchange
for all countries. Foreign exchanges so acquired
are used by all countries
(1) to pay for import of goods,
(2) to pay for import of services,
(3) to finance loans and investments in other
lands,
(4) to make unilateral transfers to other coun
tries,
(5) to pay for monetary gold acquired abroad.
The yearly systematic tabulation of a coun
try’s international trade and financial transac
tions is called the balance of payments state
ment. The above listed ten main types of trans
actions are classified into four categories:
Current Trade Accounts—which are further
divided into merchandise trade (exports and
imports) and service transactions,
The Capital Accounts—which include both
long term and short term capital movements
(inflows and outflows of capital),
Unilateral Transfers—which are subdivided
into private and governmental transfers.
The Gold Account—which records the im-

“The accounting profession is currently considering whether leases should he
capitalized and recorded on balance sheets as liabilities—a matter which touches
on many fundamental objectives and complex principles of accounting. How
ever, our experience suggests that the first step must be the establishment of
acceptable measurement techniques and disclosure of the resulting lease obli
gations. When these have been adequately tested in practice and understood
by the financial community, the best method of presentation will probably
resolve itself."
Kenneth S. Axelson, CPA
J. C. Penney and Company, Inc.
Financial Executive, July 1971
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port and export of gold.
Characteristics of the balance of payments
statement are: (1) both trade and financial
transactions are in terms of flows (in- and out
payments from a country to the rest of the
world and vice versa), (2) it is based on a
double entry accounting system, and (3) the
groups of items on the statement agree nu
merically; that is, the statement is self-bal
ancing.
The information contained in the balance
of payments is extremely useful if it is sub
jected to analysis to draw out its significant
implications. The reader should ask: In what
manner and through what processes (trade,
capital, transfer, or gold transactions) is the
overall balance being achieved?
It is also necessary to recognize that in the
free market economies of the Western World,
foreign trade and financial transactions are
freely carried out by individuals and business
firms without government interference. These
transactions are determined by such varied eco
nomic factors as consumer preferences, the
level and distribution of incomes, the prices
of goods and services at home and abroad, the
interest rates at home and abroad, and the
foreign exchange rates relative to each other.
The same economic factors operate in the other
countries as well. The legitimate question can
be asked then: How can one expect that the
in- and out-payments will be equal? The an
swer is that they will not be equal except by
chance. Planned autonomous (ex ante) in-pay
ments and out-payments do not equal, but
actually realized (ex post) in-payments and
out-payments do.
In the likely event that the planned inflow
transactions of a country are not matched by
its planned outflow transactions, there are two
avenues available to bring the two into equal
ity:
using gold reserves or accommodating trans
actions
depreciating its currency.
In the first case, if a country has an incon
sistent plan (for example: if it imports much
more than it can pay for by exports), it may
use its accumulated gold and other reserves
and/or obtain foreign loans (accommodating
transactions). In the second case, if a country
lives beyond its means, the exchange rate on
foreign currencies may rise (decreasing the
value of the domestic currency relative to for
eign currencies). The change in rates will make
the cost of all imports higher, forcing a down
ward revision in the country’s exaggerated im
port plans. At the same time, the selling price
of the country’s export goods abroad will be
come cheaper for the foreigners purchasing

them, thereby revising (upward) the original
ly laggard export plans. The exchange rate of
the country may continue to rise until the
actually realized flows are in balance. (This
is called adjustment through exchange rates).
When planned autonomous in- and out-pay
ments are not equal, a disequilibrium situation
exists which may be a deficit disequilibrium
(outflows exceed inflows) or a surplus disequi
librium (the opposite).
A country experiencing an occasional deficit
in the balance of payments need not be unduly
alarmed since the cause may be extraordinary
and non-recurring forces. However, continuous
and growing balance of payments deficits are a
serious problem, an indication of the country’s
persistent disequilibrium situation. The three
signs of a balance of payments disequilibrium
are the growing presence of accommodating
transactions, the market-induced rise in ex
change rates, and the imposition of controls
over international transactions.
Since in the Bretton Woods system the dol
lar became the key or anchor currency of in
ternational trade and finance, a highly sensi
tive role was assigned to the United States
economy and its currency. Therefore, the U.S.
balance of payments statement must be care
fully analyzed to understand the nature of
changes which led to the present-day inter
national monetary instability.

The Changing Character
of the U.S. Balance of Payments
The U.S. balance of payments displays three
distinct stages of development from 1945 to
date. The first stage, embracing the years 19461949, was characterized by huge balance of
payments surpluses, the period of dollar short
age. The second (1950-1957) was a transition
period, characterized by small planned deficits.
The third stage (1958 until today) shows per
sistent, unplanned, and rapidly growing deficits
and is sometimes called the period of dollar
glut.
Table I summarizes the trade and accom
modating transactions in the first period. In the
immediate postwar years, the war-devastated
economies of Western Europe were recon
structed and rehabilitated. All the needed ma
chinery, equipment, and even raw materials
and food supplies could come only from the
United States. To reduce substantially the re
quired time for reconstruction of foreign econ
omies, the United States adopted a variety of
financial aid programs in the form of grants
and loans. (The so-called Marshall Plan pro
vided about $25 billion.)
Analyzing Table I, it is evident that the
United States export (trade account) surplus
7

TABLE II
U.S. Balance of Payments
1950-1957

could not have been nearly so large without
the grants and loans which the U.S. Govern
ment extended to European countries which
had no dollars to pay for their large import
needs. It is correct, therefore, to say that the
grants and loans were made as a result of the
acute dollar shortage.
Table II summarizes the relevant data for
the transition period of 1950-1957. The im
proved dollar payments position of the world
shows up clearly in the increase in dollar
balances held abroad ($8.6 billion) and gold

(in billions of dollars)
Exports of goods and services
(excluding military transfers)...... $156.3
Imports of goods and services................. 134.4
Excess of exports......................
$ 21.9

Means of financing excess exports:
Private capital (net)*............ $10.8
Private remittances................... 4.7
U.S. Government grants
and loans (net).............. 20.0
Errors and omissions.............. (3.3)
Total financing.................................... 32.2
Excess of financing over export balance. $ 10.3

TABLE I
U.S. Balance of Payments
1946-1949
(in billions of dollars)

Means of financing deficit:
Increase in foreign U.S. balances
and short term claims (net)....... $ 8.6
Purchases of gold from U.S. (net)...
1.7
Total ...................................................... $ 10.3

Exports of goods and services
(excluding military transfers).......... $67.0
Imports of goods and services..................... 35.1
Excess of exports......................................... $31.9

Means of financing excess exports:
Private capital (long and
short term)............................. $2.9
Private remittances ...................... 2.5
U.S. government financing:
Loans ..................... $11.7
Grants (excluding
military transfers) . 13.1 24.8
Errors and omissions..................... (3.1)
Total net financing............................... 27.1
Excess of export balance over financing. .$ 4.8

*U.S. capital outflow, less long term foreign in
vestments in the United States

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business, various issues.

TABLE III
U.S. Balance of Payments
1958-1969
(in billions of dollars)
Exports of goods and services
(excluding military transfers)............ $392
Imports of goods and services...................... 340
Excess of exports......................................... $ 52

Means of financing surplus:
Liquidation of gold and other assets. .$ 4.8

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business, various issues.

Means of financing excess exports:
Private capital (net).................. $26
Remittances and pensions............ 9
U.S. Government grants
and loans........................................ 38
Errors and omissions..................... 11
Total financing........................................

acquired by foreign countries ($1.7 billion).
One could argue that not only had the dollar
shortage ended, but its opposite, a dollar glut,
was already starting to develop. Dollar glut
refers to the presence of a balance of payments
surplus for other countries vis-a-vis the United
States, i.e. a U.S. balance of payments deficit.
The third period data are summarized in
Table III. Since the current account displays a
large surplus, it is clear that the $32 billion
deficit was caused by the disproportionally
huge size of the capital and unilateral transfer
accounts. To put it another way, the deficit
reflects the failure of the current account to

84

Excess of financing over export balance. .$ 32

Means of financing deficit:
Increase in liabilities to foreigners,
plus decrease in gold and foreign
exchange reserves............................... $ 32

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of
Current Business and Federal Reserve Bulletin
(April, 1970), Table I, p. 316.
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adjust fully to changes in the capital and uni
lateral transfer accounts.
In analyzing the reasons for the failure of
the U.S. balance of payments to maintain an
equilibrium, one must note that:
1) The sheer magnitude of capital outflows
was caused by the heavy investments of Amer
ican business firms which set up operations
abroad (primarily in the Common Market,
England, and Japan).
2) The non-economic (political and mili
tary) considerations, such as military aid,
NATO defense, etc., average $3 billion in the
first five years and moved to nearly $5 billion
in the latter years of the period.
3) The competitive price conditions turned
against the United States, particularly after
1965, when inflationary forces gathered mo
mentum and kept on growing. Many American
products were overpriced on the world market.
Not surprisingly, the export surplus (rela
tive to total exports) began to decrease as
noted above.
During the entire postwar period the bal
ance of payments position of the United States
seriously deteriorated. The long run trend
shows that volume of world trade has ex
panded faster than world production. While
United States imports have followed this pat
tern, its exports have not!

in overvaluing the dollar and grossly under
valuing the currencies of our trading partners,
particularly those of France, West Germany,
and Japan.
A more realistic realignment of the currency
values to each other therefore became the first
order of business in the fall of 1971. There was
sharp disagreement between the United States
and her ten largest trading partners in the
Western World (the so-called Big Ten) as to
how to go about it. The U.S. recommended
an upward valuation (appreciation) of the
undervalued currencies relative to the U.S.
dollar, while the general desire of the Big Ten
was a direct devaluation of the dollar.
When no agreement was in sight, the Presi
dent of the U.S. on August 15, 1971 declared
that:
1) foreign held dollar balances will no longer
convert to gold and
2) a 10% protective duty on commodities
imported to the U.S. would apply temporarily.
Following months of hard negotiating, an
agreement was finally reached in December
1971 resulting in:
1) appreciation of the Western foreign cur
rencies relative to the U.S. dollar by an average
of 8.5 percent and
2) U.S. agreement that the German mark,
French franc, and Dutch guilder will have no
fixed rate but will find their values to the
dollar on a “floating” basis determined by
these countries’ demand and supply of dollars.
It was hoped that this agreed upon realign
ment of currency values to each other would
affect favorably the U.S. balance of payments
since U.S. export goods would become less
expensive and more competitive abroad while
import goods became more expensive in the
U.S. The expansion of U.S. exports and the
shrinkage of U.S. imports were predicted to
develop a U.S. trade surplus, eliminate the
overall payments deficit, and restore inter
national confidence in the dollar abroad; then
a new and permanent international monetary
system could be arranged.

The Immediate Problem:
Restoring U.S. Balance of Payments
In the years 1970 and 1971 the U.S. bal
ance of payments deteriorated even more seri
ously. As the export surplus decreased rapidly
(in 1970 the trade account surplus became a
mere $0.4 billion), the size of the payments
deficits became larger and larger. By the sum
mer of 1971, a deficit in the United States trade
account (trade deficit) developed for the first
time in this century. The 1971 deficit is likely
to be around $300 billion, and U.S. gold re
serves have already dwindled to little more
than $10 billion. The accumulated United
States deficits in recent years, appearing as
dollar surpluses on the balance of payments
of U.S. trading partners, created a new prob
lem. By mid-1971 some $50 billion of so-called
“Eurodollars” were sloshing around in foreign
money markets undermining the confidence in
the U.S. dollar, the very foundation of the
international monetary system.
In the most recent years, the values of cur
rencies to each other became more and more
misaligned. Under the Bretton Woods system,
the rates of exchange were fixed (pegged) with
only rare and infrequent changes permitted.
The changing economic conditions in the
United States and the rest of the world resulted

The Prospects for the Future
The hopes attached to the December 1971
agreement did not materialize. The U.S. trade
deficit kept on growing; it amounted to over
$500 billion in February 1972 and over $800
billion in April 1972. It appears now that it
will take a substantially longer time before the
U.S. balance of payments deficit problem is
solved. And solving this problem is a necessary
prerequisite to setting up a new international
monetary order to replace the defunct Bretton
Woods arrangement.
9

upon the holdings of the reserve currencies.
They are created by the decision of the I.M.F.
In 1970 about 3.5 billion SDRs were distrib
uted among the member nations. After having
acquired SDRs, a country is free to use them
as the need arises to cover balance of payments
deficits. The country may use its SDRs to buy
needed foreign currencies from other members
of the I.M.F. Member countries are willing to
accept SDRs because of the certaintv that
they can always exchange the acquired SDRs
for other currencies.
The creation of SDRs (in fact a new “fiat
reserve assets”) was an important first step
toward the development of the concept of a
“World Central Bank.” It is expected that the
concept of this new reserve asset will play an
important role in the new international mone
tary system which must be created.

When the U.S. economic house is put in
order and the confidence in the dollar abroad
is restored, still another problem remains and
will require solution jointly by all partners
involved. This second problem arises from
the fact that international trade among the
Western countries expanded at a rate faster
than financing ability (under the old Bretton
Woods system tied to gold holdings) expanded.
This was recognized by the international mone
tary community. The International Monetary
Fund (an agency of the United Nations in
monetary affairs) devised as early as 1967 the
so-called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Un
like gold, SDRs arc merely bookkeeping entries
in the special account of the International
Monetary Fund—hence, the use of the name
“paper gold.” SDRs arc used only in inter
governmental transactions, and their supply
is not dependent on the mining of gold, nor

Sources:
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tions. New York: Random House, Ine., 1966.
Chapter i.
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ment Printing Office, 1962.
Yeager, Leland B. and Tuerck, David G. Trade
Policy and the Price System. Scranton, Pa.: In
ternational Textbook Co., 1966.

Kreinin, Mordechai E. Alternative Commercial
Policies—Their Effect on the American Economy.
East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State Univer
sity, 1967.
Machlup, Fritz. Plans for Reform of the Interna
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Princeton University, 1962.
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The above manuscript has been adapted from an earlier one printed in the October
1971 issue of “Midsouth Business and Economic Review”.

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO—

From "THE WOMAN CPA," June 1947
I think the most dangerous things in the world and the ones that have caused continual
turbulence are the inequalities, the senseless, man-made inequalities that could be done
away with—social inequality, economic inequality, race inequality, sex inequality—they
mean not only unhappiness, but terrible waste. It may be suggested that after these in
equalities are abolished, the real inequalities begin, and with that I agree. But the others
are inherent inequalities which have always benefited the race—inequality of mind, of
emotional powers, of strength, or of beauty. In our time it looks as if economic equality is
the one we are first headed toward abolishing. But I believe, of all the inequalities, sex
inequality may have caused the most waste.

—MARY COLUM, in "Life and the Dream." (Doubleday & Co.)
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